Winning Local Constituency

The Rajapaksa government’s foremost strategy was to win the local audience, especially Sinhalese and international community on its side to isolate and dislodge Tigers. Domestically Rajapaksa regime was successful in advancing and capitalising the national sentiments of the majority Sinhalese on its war against the LTTE. Rajapaksa’s pro-Sinhala rural image and considerable support from the Sinhala hardliners — JVP, Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) — and Buddhist cleric helped him to win the majority Sinhalese. In fact, the LTTE’s violent behaviour—the closing of Mavil Aru water way and air attacks on Colombo—gave a measure of credibility to the Rajapaksa government’s justification for progressing with the war and gaining the local support. Significantly, a whopping 84% of the Sri Lankans had then approved the war strategy of the government, according to the opinion poll conducted by National Peace Council. [The National Peace Council (NPC) along with the MARGA Institute in Sri Lanka conducted the poll]. The public disillusionment of LTTE’s suicide attacks on senior Sri Lankan officials, including the defence secretary and places like Katunayake airport too provided credibility to the government’s justification for military approach. 2

Further, the then President Rajapaksa went ahead with agenda of gaining popular Sinhalese support through launching large scale recruitment for security forces apart from hiking pay for public sector and government employees. About 40 percent of top jobs that were filled had gone to the rural Sinhala segment of the population.3 These measures consolidated his support base where the benefitted southern Sinhalese stood loyal to his government’s military approaches. Also, to demonstrate to the local constituency that he is keen on bringing development, Rajapaksa went ahead with the signing of deals with China on mega development projects like Hambantota Port and Hambantota Airport.

Politically, he created a jumbo cabinet by bringing in all the parties and independent members through either splitting the opposition parties or wooing many. This helped to ensure political stability. Mahinda Rajapaksa’s determination as a political leader and the head of the security forces to go on with the battle till the military objectives were completely attained aided the defence forces’ nuanced planning and war tactics. For instance, even after facing debacle like the Muhamalai where 120 soldiers were killed by the LTTE in just one day on 23 April 2008, he went ahead with bold decisions to pursue military means. Reportedly, he was part of the entire decision-making by personally attending all the security related council meetings every Wednesday. He posted his brothers and other family members in key positions, particularly, Gotabaya Rajapaksa as defence secretary; Basil Rajapaksa as political trouble-shooter, which helped to withstood enormous political pressure.

Silence Critics

While focused on winning the Sinhala population’s support, the Rajapaksa made every effort to silence the critics and opposition parties who were against his policy through various means including adopting intimidation. This to an extent contributed for the government’s uninterrupted ‘peace through war strategy.’4 Particularly, he nudged the local media to cease the flood of negative reporting on the military operation and civilian causalities. Further, ‘white van syndrome,’ what is popularly called for a series of abductions and murders of critics such as media persons that allegedly includes Sunday Leader Editor Lasantha Wickrematunge that took place during the Eelam War IV are the case in point. Colombo Telegraph cites Amnesty International and reports that at least 15 journalists and media workers have been killed and 30 seriously injured since January 2006 to 2012.5 Apparently, white van without number plates’ would come and then people vanish afterwards without mostly any tracing. Report states that it was carried out in accordance with the orders of Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the former Secretary of the Ministry of Defence.6 In fact, Gotabaya Rajapaksa in his interview to Daily Mirror acknowledges prevalence of white vans to “take in” suspects by the intelligence agencies. 7

Also, Rajapaksa regime used all means to silence the voice of civil society groups by imposing new regulations8 in an effort to monitor and block any outflow of information of local condition to the outside world through them. The Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that operated in the North and East of Sri Lanka was asked to leave or downgrade its staffs.9 The Sri Lankan Government’s increased scrutiny and regulation on the humanitarian agencies through the established Parliamentary Select Committee and Presidential Task Force such as inquire into the activities of the NGOs and visa issuance for the foreigners were some cases in point. 10

Build Strong Military

With gradual success in the military operations from Mavil Aru, the Rajapaksa regime understandably realised they need to increase the force strength to overpower the Tigers who were facing shortages of youth recruits in the Eastern Province. Consequently, his government made vigorous recruitment drives during the Eelam War IV; targeting ‘patriotic’ Sinhalese bachelors in Southern Sri Lanka aged 18-26. For instance, the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence sent out campaign message such as, “young patriots — come join with our armed forces and be a part of a winning team.”11 Incidentally, in order to facilitate the rapid recruitment process, the qualification requirements were tweaked so that even with the lowest possible level one can join the army. Special walk-in interviews too were exclusively conducted in Sinhalese areas.

This was essential as the Sri Lankan military had an authorised strength of 120,000 personnel in 2005,12 but losses in combat and desertion13 has kept operational strength much lesser than the above, according to news reports. To meet the LTTE’s challenge, the Sri Lankan Army rapidly bolstered its strength up to 200,000 in 2009 with the Light Infantry, Sinha, Gemunu, Gajaba, Vijayaba units and the Sri Lanka National Guard absorbing most of the fresh recruits.14 The armoury and artillery, too, were boosted; this gave an unprecedented firepower for the SLAF. The Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Special Presidential Guard and Civil Defence Force (a new paramilitary unit from the East) were created newly within the army. Similarly, with the alleged Sri Lankan Muslims who speak Tamil were enrolled in the Army’s special unit15 for surveillance activities. On 13 January 2009, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, the then Army Commander declared that “today the Army is strong with 180,000 personnel, whereas a few years ago, we had just 116,000 people. We elevated ourselves not just with man power but with well trained, sharp and skilled professionals.”16

Ultimately, Rajapaksa regime strengthens its firepower by going for vigorous arms procurement.17 Tamil Net report dated 22 January 2005 claimed that the Sri Lankan Government had a defence deal with Iran through its USD 150 million credit line.18 Similarly, the Sri Lanka had several defence agreements with China including those for the supply of modern radar and large quantities of ammunition. 19 As per Jane's Defence Weekly, Sri Lanka signed a confidential amount of about USD 37.6 million deals with China's Poly Technologies in April 2007 for ammunition and ordnance for the Army and Navy such as 120 mm mortar shells (70,000 rounds priced at USD10.4 million), 152 mm artillery shells (68,000 worth USD 20 million) and 81 mm high-explosive mortar bombs (50,000 priced USD 3.7 million), 14.5 mm cartridges (100,000 nos.), and RPG-7 rockets (2,000 nos.). Similarly, China National Electronics Import Export Corp provided JY11 3D radar for USD 5 million.

Pakistan too reportedly supplied a range of hardware, including the multi-barrel rocket launchers, Heckler and Koch G3 rifle (manufactured under license by POF) and 120mm heavy mortars91. 20 The military hardware was also allegedly procured from Ukraine and Israel for the SLAF to considerably improve its operations.

These procured arms and India, China and Pakistan’s special military training assistance had tremendous impact on the SLAF and its military victory against LTTE as it not only contributed for the modernisation of security forces but also helped to progress with the war with superior firepower.

Entice Karuna

While engaged in winning Sinhalese population in the South, the Rajapaka’s administration focused on enticing Karuna faction to secure their support in the Eastern Province primarily and the Northern Province subsequently. Apparently, the Sri Lankan Government’s reading is that the former LTTE commander Karuna could be won as he had to protect himself against the LTTE and its chief Prabhakaran for breaking the organisation. As anticipated, Karuna switched his loyalty to the Rajapaksa government for his endurance protection and this certainly added value to government’s goal.21 Incidentally, Karuna’s allegiance to the Rajapaksa government not only gave the government safeguard but also in gaining political status where he was permitted to maintain his armed group’s forces and subsequently his political faction Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulihal (TVMP) become an alliance partner of ruling United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) of Rajapaksa in the Eastern Province.22 In short, Karuna’s TVMP ensured that the LTTE weekend with no substantially recruitment from the Eastern Province apart from sharing precise intelligence on the former boss and his strategies.

Shed Conventional Military Methods

The Rajapaksa regime through the Army Commander Gen. Fonseka conceived the military strategy that abandoned the conventional military tactics to match the Tigers’ guerrilla tactics and strategies. Foremost, getting rid of the traditional war strategies gave a benefit for military to fight the LTTE on a multiple frontline. Second, Sri Lankan Police Special Task Force (PSTF) and a small Deep Penetrating Units (DPU) were deployed along with the Army in conflict zones. Three, Naval and Air Forces personnel were entirely deployed in support of the ground operations at the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

A small Tamil speaking Eastern Tamils of Karuna group and Muslims who are familiar with the terrain and landscape were apparently used to their advantage in their attacks. The increased numerical strength and fire power of the SLAF aided in launching surprise ambushes and raids and sabotage of a vulnerable target.

Interestingly, the Sri Lankan Army espoused an offensive approach, whereas, the LTTE adopted defensive approach owing to significant challenges of new recruitments and earlier huge losses in the 2004 Tsunami. Evidently, even before the beginning of final phase of war in 2006, the then President Chandrika Kumaratunga's on 30 December 2004 said “the threat of war is remoter (sic) than on December 25 (the day before the Tsunami) because the LTTE has suffered heavy casualties, if not anything else.” 23 In her assessment the LTTE had lost almost all its main naval bases on the North-eastern coastal belt and elucidate that the casualties in LTTE as “very high.”

Also, the breakup of eastern commanding faction by the Karuna and subsequent dearth of new recruitments for the Tigers had put it in defensive mode. Evidently the validation of above assertion was confirmed by the reclusive Colonel Karuna in his interview to the BBC's Colombo correspondent Roland Buerk where he candidly stated “by leaving the LTTE, they have lost 70% of their fighting capacity.” 24

Shrivel Tigers holdings

The Sri Lankan government’s priority under Rajapaksa as president was to win militarily first, then to talk about political question later on its own terms. Hence, the then President Rajapaksa was keen to shrivel territory’s that were under Tigers control in order to force the political solution on his own term after major battle gain. In line, the Rajapaksa government moved forward with military option when Tigers blocked the Mavil Aru water canal near Muttur on 21 July 2006. The Tigers’ misconstrue provided opportunity for the government to move ahead with its plan to test its capability against the LTTE. With the triumph in Mavil Aru, government designed plan to liberate the Eastern Province first from the clutches of the LTTE, thereby, weakening its ability to operate and regroup in the eastern part of the island.

In accordance, the security forces carried out a pre-emptive assault and captured Muttur on 5 August 2006, Sampur on 4 September 2006, [Another reason for lunching offensive at Sampur was that the Sri Lankan government concern about the strategically crucial navy base in Trinconmalee which was reportedly under grave threat from LTTE’s Sampur base, induced to launch offensive and captured it. This was the first ever territorial change in Sri Lanka after the 2002 CFA] Vaharai on 19 January 2007 and Thoppigala—the last pocket of influence of the Tigers in the East—on 11 July 2007. In accomplishing this, the government adeptly roped in the Karuna faction; indeed, the military victories in the East are largely credited to the inputs provided by the Karuna faction about LTTE tactics.

As the government achieved its objective in the East, in early 2008 it devised a chart to bring about a democratic set up before moving to northern front. This move becomes necessary for the government to effectively nullify the international community criticism and pacify the local Tamils. Accordingly, a democratic administration headed by Chief Minister Sivanesathurai Chanthirakanthan alias Pillaiyan of TMVP was set up. The TMVP was rewarded in keeping with government’s concern to ward off Tigers’ regrouping as well to instil and draw Eastern Tamils confidence on Rajapaksa government. A former terrorist group leader giving up arms and successfully entering the mainstream politics and embracing democracy in a meaningful way in Eastern Province was demonstrated as a good example to the domestic and international audience.

With victory in the East, SLAF under Rajapaksa formulated its ensuing military strategies on the Northern front. Accordingly, few important stratagems that were adopted are:

• Clear A9 Highway

• Operations from West to East - deny access to western sea

• Operate Navy and Air Force concurrently

Clear A9 highway

After liberating the East, the government set its focus on clearing A9 highway. The strategy was to get land access to Jaffna that can facilitate troop’s movement as well as to cut off the comfort of Tigers’ funds generation through tax and their movement. In consistent with the above plan, Sri Lankan government closed A9 highway at Muhamalai in August 2006.25 The closing of A9 highway was the biggest loss for the LTTE as the revenue that it got through toll tax reduced considerably that was one of the important source of domestic finance for sustaining the Tigers. Incidentally, while the sealing off A9 highway affected the population and essential service movement, government continued the blockade.

Operations from West to East

As far as the north is concerned, the SLAF military tactics was that it will move from the West of the island i.e. Mannar, Vavuniya, & Jaffna towards the Eastern areas of Mullaitivu and Killinochchi which was evident through the operations took place from 2007 to 2009. The two most important objectives of this tactics was to deny the western sea access to the LTTE and thereby averting their escape to Tamil Nadu and next, also, can prevent the fleeing of affected Tamils to India as refugees, which could flare up political momentum in Tamil Nadu against Colombo.

The 57th Division of the Sri Lankan Army on March 2007 marched from Vavuniya to Killinochchi, while 58th Division launched its operations from the Silavathura area in Mannar to Killinochchi through the annexed Poonaryn. Equally, the 53rd and 55th Divisions of the Army consolidated Elephant Pass and Chalai and moved towards Killinochchi.26 On 2^nd January 2009, Kilinochchi, the de-facto administrative and political capital of the LTTE was captured by Sri Lanka Army. It was a big blow to the Tigers’ mobility. Contrary, the occupation of Kilinochchi enabled the government to re-establish its control over a vital highway linking the northern Jaffna peninsula with the rest of the country.27 The LTTE was left out with small territory of Mullaitivu, where they retreated along the northeastern coastal district.

Operate Navy and Air Force concurrently

The triumphed government determined to continue its operation as per the devised strategy through using Navy and Air Force to deny access to the Tigers and in inflicting damage to the LTTE strong base Mullaitivu while the military’s DPU permeated into Forward Defence Lines (FDL) in Mullaitivu. Sri Lankan Government on 25^th January 2009 made it publicly that its troops had entered Mullaitivu, the last major rebel bastion. With this the LTTE was confined to a small area, between Vishwamadhu and Puthukkudiyiruppu. Finally, on 18 May 2009 the Sri Lankan Government declared that the LTTE was defeated at Vellamullivaikal, near Nanthikadal lagoon and its chief Prabhakaran was killed. This brought Eelam War IV in particular and protracted armed conflict in general to an end.

Keep in loop but deter India

Sri Lanka quiet sure that while focused on domestic factors it is the India factor that could make influence in the course of battle outcome for the Colombo’s efforts. In line, the Rajapaksa Government even as kept engaging New Delhi, it deterred proactive approaches of India by bringing in China card strategically. In a sense, Sri Lanka listen to India’s concern on war and proposed ceasefire options and even received Indian delegation and engaged at top political leadership level but continued its arms procurement and engagement with China, Pakistan and other countries. By means of placing higher demand for lethal weapons to New Delhi, Sri Lanka also put India on back foot as the latter can’t cater to the Colombo’s need and hence, advocated their need for approaching China and Pakistan. It was like ‘give us the weapons that we need or please keep away, we can find help elsewhere.’

The long-standing Indian policy of ensuring welfare of minority Sri Lankan Tamil community along with the reminder of assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by the alleged LTTE members kept India in catch-22 situation. The Rajapaksa regime skilfully used this predicament of India to their favour. It was because Rajapaksas realized that keeping India aligned to Colombo's military objectives in its battle against the LTTE was important and doesn’t want any sort of repetition of 1987 episode. As expected, tactful India who cannot supply everything that Colombo asked but provided some weapons, training and intelligence sharing and kept away from engaging the LTTE messengers.

In fact, it was the India’s tactful support that contributed for the Sri Lanka’s success against the LTTE. 28 While there was uneasiness between New Delhi and Colombo on various issues time to time such as Sri Lanka’s military cooperation with Pakistan and China to human rights, it was the India’s silence and diplomatic approval of the Sri Lanka’s stratagem that aided the SLAF advancement in dislodging the LTTE leadership.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa acknowledged this in this statement “the manner in which President Rajapaksa tackled India was a key factor of our military success. We knew that only India influences us militarily. India is a huge power in our neighbourhood and our proximity to Tamil Nadu with 60 million Tamils sensitive to what's going on in Sri Lanka made the situation extremely complex for us. We knew that while other countries could or would resort to economic sanctions, only India had the power to militarily influence the course of our war operations. So it is to the credit of President Rajapaksa that he was successful in keeping New Delhi aligned with Colombo's military objectives.” 29

Managing Tamil Nadu Factor

The Colombo was aware of New Delhi’s sensitive to the concerns of Tamil Nadu government and its coalition partner, the DMK’s regard to civilian causalities in war, hence, then President Rajapaksa regime ensured that they will always resemble amenable to the New Delhi’s view while on ground it could differ. For instance, on 27 April 2009 when the then Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi of the Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam (DMK) went on a sudden fast at the Anna Memorial in Chennai demanding ending of the Sri Lankan offensive in the North, the Rajapaksa regime immediately announced that it is ceasing the combat operations and shelling. As a result, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister ended his fast in six hours’ time.30 This was a classic example of Rajapaksa regime diplomatic tactics with India and towards Tamil Nadu.

Neutralize West

While kept India in loop, the Rajapaksa regime disengaged the service of Norway and other western powers in Sri Lanka by making it clear that they are not interested in progressing with peace talks. Sri Lanka also indicted that Norway and the EU were supporting the Tigers through CFA and peace talks31 as a reason for snubbing the mediators.

Sri Lanka was successful in advocating the danger of giving breathing space to the Tigers who had generally used it only for regrouping and continuing the conflict, which the Western government began acknowledging with the silence of India, close neighbour. Brian Stewart states that “there was consensus that anything that ended Sri Lanka's brutal, on-and-off-again civil war would be far better than letting the conflict continue,”32 which produced hundreds of thousands of refugees so far.

Curb Tigers’ International Network

The Sri Lankan government put its energy and effort relentlessly to get LTTE proscribed internationally by taking the fight against LTTE as part of the global war on terrorism. In fact, the Rajapaka government successfully used the ‘terrorism’ card effectively in the changed global scenario after 2001 September attack at New York. The narration of Tigers’ that they are freedom fighters who are fighting for the liberation against Sinhalese oppressive domestic regimes didn’t succeed much in 2005 afterwards as the world has increasingly tightened their approach towards groups that employed terrorist means. Sri Lanka believed that there is a necessity to counter LTTE propaganda and activities internationally to achieve its strategy locally.

The LTTE that was proscribed over the years by countries like India (1992) and the U.S. (1997) with the list of assassination of two heads of state straightforwardly fitted into the Colombo’s narration in appealing the Western countries. As a result, the Sri Lankan government under Rajapaksa was able to curb the Tigers’ international network that was deemed as lifeline of rebels. The LTTE’s network from Canada to Australia that engaged in fund-raising, weapons purchase, narcotics dealing, and credit card frauds, etc. were brought under the surveillance and gradually confiscation of the money and materials by various countries. The U.S.,33 Canada,34 UK,35 France, Italy and many others have arrested and prosecuted LTTE agents. Consequently, the Tigers funding and activities had suffered tremendously. As a result, the Sri Lanka succeeded in isolating the LTTE diplomatically and financially and thereby curtailed its $200 million per year fund-raising network.36 The draining of funding and global diplomatic support eroded its combat potential.

Mission Mullaitivu - Liquidate LTTE leadership

The Sri Lankan government’s decision to pursue military strategies was clear since 2006 but apparently the Rajapaksa government didn’t have a plan of eliminating the LTTE leadership at first. This objective was stepped-up with the pace of the triumph by Sri Lanka Army. While the LTTE’s principal negotiator, S.P. Tamilselvan, was killed on November 2007 in an air raid, the fall of Killinochchi and then Mullaitivu boosted the Rajapaksa’s buoyancy that they can certainly liquidate the LTTE chief Prabhakaran. That’s why Sri Lankan Government didn’t agree for ceasefire demand of the LTTE or of India that came from Tamil Nadu in 2008-2009 periods. In the end, the LTTE chief was announced as dead by the Sri Lankan government on 18 May 2009 37 through its operation.